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also can be, has been, and to this
seen as a feature of the relationships,
institutions, and terms of engagement through which people constitute themselves as communities. Think of this as a kind of harmony too, in which
citizens share a tolerably similar understanding of what free and equal citizens
are due.
The above remarks emphasize the underlying consistency of our thinking
about justice. Admittedly, however, many an honest reader of Plato's Republic
feels an uneasy skepticism about whether harmony among parts of the polis is
simply a 'writ large' form of harmony among parts of the soul, rather than a
separate topic. Once we see them as separate topics, it is natural to wonder
whether they are even related.
Yet, there is a relation, for we are social beings. When we live in communities, our psychology makes it essential to our internal harmony that we
engage our community in a particular way: honestly and sympathetically;
constructively and creatively; humbly, for we can be wrong, yet bravely, for
whole communities can be wrong too. Finally, as David Hume and Adam
Smith understood, we must judge impartially, because we cannot be part of a
healthy network of reciprocal sympathy until we become skilled at seeing
things from perspectives of our would-be partners. We need terms of engagement that enable us to flourish together when we do not even agree on what the
terms of engagement ought to be.
In short, to be harmonious souls, we need to be co-authors of a harmonious
community. Thus, while the virtues of a person are logically distinct from
virtues of a harmonious community, the connections are robust in two directions. First, the harmonious soul of a social being wants to be a contributing
part of a harmonious community. Second, a harmonious community essentially is one that teaches (and otherwise induces) citizens to become harmonious souls. This harmony bears on justice in the modern sense. That is, a
virtuous community does not take for granted the virtue of its citizens ..rlt treats
good character as the endogenous variable that it is, shaped by the community
in which characters grow. A harmonious community teaches a citizen to see
good reason (when there is good reason) to obey the rules, and to be disposed
to obey rules even in cases where obeying rules does less good (for self or
others) than breaking them.
This essay considers (and endorses) three complementary conceptions of
justice as virtue. To the two senses of justice just mentioned-justice as a
virtue of the soul and of the polis-we add a third that bridges these two.
Virtue can be a kind of outreach rather than a kind of internal harmony,
because we are talking about essentially social beings. The harmony that is this
virtue's object is harmony with a community. Thus, a person who is just in this
sense is disposed to respect (play within the rules of) institutions that command respect by virtue of actually working-that is, actually succeeding in
encouraging and enabling people to live in harmony, to peacefully flourish in
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mutually advantageous ways. A just person in this sense is disposed to respect
just institutions even when such respect is not personally advantageous,
indeed (as Hume saw) when such respect is not even good for the community
in the particular case.
We begin by asking what it would be like to make progress in theorizing
about the nature of justice as a virtue.

DIVERSITY
Commenting on Thomas Scanlon's What We Owe Each Other, David Gauthier
observes that 'what we owe to others' is not the first question. Before asking
that, we could ask why we should assume we owe anything to others. 5 The
question is neither skeptical nor sinister. It is simply a paradigm of the sort
of question that philosophers learn not to take for granted. It is the sort of
question that ought to have an answer, and being able to answer it would be
illuminating.
The idea that justice is something we have reason to endorse might be
thought to beg the question in favor of consequentialism by presuming that
the good is prior to the right. Not so.
people have different conceptions
of justice. When people have different conceptions, then theorizing about
justice will be a search for reasons to view justice in one way rather than
another. This is so regardless of whether the good is prior to the right.
Second, the generic idea-that justice has to do with what people are duehas content that does not reduce to how the concept relates to human flourishing. (For example, it seems built into the concept that punishment is not an
innocent person's due.) But the fact remains that there are many ways of
fleshing out the generic idea. Sorting out rival conceptions sometimes requires
going beyond considerations internal to the generic concept. When everything
built into the generic concept has been brought to bear on the task of sorting out
rival conceptions, without resolution, then that leaves us with no reason not to
appeal to considerations transparently external to justice. Such considerations
sometimes reveal that not all ways of conceiving our due are equally good.
Moreover, the thought that some external considerations are worth caring
about implies nothing about whether external considerations are more fundamental than, or morally prior to, principles of justice. They are merely external,
and that is the point. Because they are external, they can serve as nonquestion-begging avenues for continuing inquiry when there is nothing
more to say by way of giving internal reasons for favoring one conception

5

Gauthier (2003).
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over another. If our intention is to be talking about justice as
we are
better off with than without, arid if justice conceived in a particular way would
make us worse off, that tells us that justice conceived in that particular way is
not what we are after.
Again, however, none of that implies that 'better off' and 'worse off' are
foundational ideas. If justice is itself foundational, it may have no deeper
foundation. In that case, we can ask what justice is a foundation for. We can
evaluate the soundness of a house's foundation without presuming there is
something more foundational than the foundation. We ask what can be built
on it: what kind of house, what kind of life. We do all this without forgetting
for a moment that foundations are not everything. 6

Disagreement
Reasonable people disagree about what is just. Why? This itself is an item over
which reasonable people disagree. Analyses of justice all seem to have counterexamples. We have looked so hard for so long. Why have we not found what
we are looking for?
In part, the problem lies in the nature of theorizing itself. We have learned
from philosophy of science that for any set of data, an infinite number of
theories will fit the facts. Theorizing per se does not produce consensus. To be
sure, social pressure produces consensus. But consensus is not what we are after.
Why not? Either an argument is sound, or not. So why isn't a theory
compelling to all of us, if sound, or none of us, if not? As noted, our account
of justice is not even trying to give necessary and sufficient conditions.
A theory in our sense is more like a map that represents some particular
territory without purporting to show everything. Maps are practical. We want
a particular map because we want to go somewhere and arrive safely. If we are
traveling by car, we will want a road map. If we are traveling by foot, we may
need another kind of map, perhaps a topographic map. The two maps will
differ markedly even if they are mapping the same territory and even if they
each are doing so successfully on their own terms. 7
6
As to whether justice actually is foundational, there is a thicket of questions here that may
have answers, but not quick answers. It is possible for something to be foundational-that is,
conversation-stopping-in one context but not another. It is possible for something to be
foundational at one level of inquiry but not in another. So, 'blue' might be a conversationstopping answer to 'what color is the sky?' but not to 'why is the sky blue?' 'Because it's just' can
be a conversation-stopping answer to 'why should I give my employee the wage she earned?' but
not to 'what makes you so sure that justice requires us to equate wages with earnings?' See
Schmidtz (2006).
7
A good cartographer is cautious about extrapolating. So too with the best maps of the terrain
of justice, perhaps especially the best ones. They will be like a map whose author declines to
speculate about unexplored avenues, knowing there is a truth of the matter yet leaving those
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We would be astounded if two cartography students separately assigned to
map the same terrain came up with identical maps. We would doubt they were
working independently. Theorists working independently likewise construct
different theories. Not seeing how the terrain underdetermines choices they
make about how to map it, they assume their theory cannot be true unless rival
theories are false, and seek to identify ways in which rival accounts distort the
terrain. Naturally, they find some, and such demonstration seems decisive to
them, but not to rivals, who barely pay attention, preoccupied as they are with
demonstrations of their own.
Intractable though these theoretical disagreements may seem, there also
(theorists seem to agree) seems to be less disagreement over how we should
treat each other day to day. Why? Part of that is due to the tendency of
harmonious, healthy souls not to suffer from an urge to fix what is not broken.
To be sure, some people believe that justice requires us to tear down existing
institutions and rebuild society so that it conforms to justice as they conceive
it. Others may feel the same, differing only in the particulars of their vision of
what has to be torn down and what has to replace it. When we stop theorizing
and leave the seminar room, though, we deal with the world as it is. I
my
car in the parking lot. You find yours. We drive off without incident. The fact,
mundane yet striking, is that we do not need daily discussion of how cars
ought to be distributed, and the very fact that no discussion is needed is
constitutive of successfully specified terms of engagement. If we are to live in
harmony, we need a level of consensus on a long and mostly inarticulate list of
'dos' and 'don'ts' that constitute the ordinary sense of injustice with which we
navigate in our social world. The consensus we need to achieve concerns how
(not why) to treat each other, and we need to achieve consensus where we do
achieve it: in practice.
In effect, there are two ways for people to agree: we can agree on what is
correct, or on who gets to decide. Freedom of religion took the latter form; we
learned to be liberals in matters of religion, reaching consensus not on what to
believe but on who gets to decide. No conception of the one true religion is
allowed to be imposed on everyone else, no matter how certain people feel
about the truth of the matter. Freedom of speech is the same. The point of
respecting freedom of speech isn't to impose a conception of the truth, or even
a conception of'diversity.' The point is to stop presuming to decide as a society.
Isn't it odd that our greatest successes in learning how to live together stem not

parts of the map blank. Imagine the proverbial blind people groping around the body of the
elephant. Since the beast is not everywhere the same, reports from the tail are bound to be unlike
reports from the trunk. The reports may all be correct, too, so long as the reporters are wise
enough to resist the temptation to over-generalize from their own experience, and humble
enough to resist the temptation to think something must be wrong with anyone who has a
different perspective.
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from agreeing on what is correct but from
to let
decide for
themselves?
·
Justice, whatever else it is, has to do with people getting their due. In part
because justice is about people getting their due when they do not even agree
on what to count as their due, justice is about who gets to decide what people
are due. It is about defining jurisdictions that respect persons who may want
and need to share the road, but who may neither want nor need to share a
destination. Thus, the ubiquitous fact of disagreement, and the imperative to
come to terms, peaceful terms, with people who may have very different
theories about how things ought to be, give people a reason to seek a conception of justice that is in this sense liberal-a conception that aims not to dictate
our destination so much as to manage traffic, including commercial traffic, so
that we may avoid harmful collisions and also so that we may find our own
way toward local opportunities for mutually advantageous cooperative ventures. The goal is to limit piracy and parasitism (including parasitism wrapped
in the rhetoric of justice), thereby facilitating trust, and thereby promoting
gradual, reliable, peaceful progress.
To the extent that jurisdictions express mutual respect, they express impartiality as well. No one has to accept being relegated to a category of persons
whose destination in life is dictated by someone else. Just jurisdictions embody
terms of engagement that everyone can live with. 8 Perhaps some people are
unreasonable; perhaps not. Part of being just is acknowledging that, so long as
they are not acting in such a way that we truly would be better off without
it is not our place to pronounce on their reasonableness. Suppose we
want something from them. Suppose we want what they can give us so badly
that we are tempted to deem them unreasonable if they do not give it to us.
Still, even in that case, justice is not about convincing ourselves that they are
unreasonable. It is about finding a way to offer them what they want in return,
such that each of us can truly say our partners are better off with us than
without us.

FROM CHARACTER TO COMPACT
Plato and Aristotle saw justice as a virtue of persons, as did the Stoics. So did
David Hume. The difference between these ancients and Hume is that, for
Hume, although justice is a personal virtue, it is also an 'artificial' one. Natural
justice is relatively invariant because the circumstances of justice are preloaded
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into our psychology in the form of moral emotions.
are also 'artificial'
because in each particular society, the natural emotions of resentment and
guilt will generate and reinforce rules of justice. Because circumstances vary,
the particular rules of the road developed to instantiate frameworks for
mutually advantageous cooperation will not be universal. Rules of justice
vary in an analogous way. Hurne writes:
All birds of the same species, in every age and country, build their nests alike: In
this we see the force of instinct. Men, in different times and places, frame their
houses differently: Here we perceive the influence of reason and custom ... all
houses have a roof and walls, windows and chimneys; though diversified in their
shape, figure, and materials. The purpose of the latter, directed to the conveniences of human life, discover not more plainly their origin from reason and
reflection, than do those of the former, which point to a like end. 9

Outside of what Hume calls the
of justice'
circumstances of moderate scarcity and limited altruism), justice
be 'an idle
ceremonial, and could never have place in the catalogue of virtues.' 10 Justice
allows a society to do better than it might do
He
'the
necessity of justice to the support of society is the sole '"'"-""~T'",.,
virtue.' 11 We benefit from the disposition to follow the rules
of the goods that rules of justice help us to secure when ........ .,.,.............,
justice conceived in a certain way failed to conduce to peaceful ~v·uv•..... u.uv
even on balance, justice so conceived would lose its
It would be like a
hammer for which there is no need-a dead weight.
As Julia Annas notes, the Humean distinction between artificial and natural
virtues makes less sense in the ancient context than in ours. 12
for the
ancients, was a necessary condition for
a
and successful life.
virtue including justice has to be natural in Hume's sense because all virtues
conduce to living well without fail, not
on balance.
This understanding of justice is implausible to a modern ear. To moderns,
justice can require sacrifice. Imagine Pete learns that he has 1 ... ~.,...h,,a...1r,,n1-hr
committed a crime. Being a just person, he turns himself in to the authorities.
The virtue of justice, in this case, leads Pete to give up on what a modern
would think of as flourishing. How can we say then that justice is a natural
virtue, necessary (and on some views sufficient) for flourishing when acting
justly can be so costly? 13 One ancient approach was to tie flourishing to
objective characteristics of the soul. Pete
in weak moments suspect he
is throwing his life away, but on some ancient conceptions that cannot be so,
or at least not in a way that matters, so long as his soul is what it should be.
9

8

Part of the tragedy here is that we cannot take 'everyone' literally. To be honest, we have to
mean something like 'everyone but criminals.' Or more precisely, albeit recursively, 'everyone
disposed to find and live by terms of engagement that everyone (similarly disposed) can live by.'
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10
Hume (1988), 97, III.2.44-5.
Hume (1988), 83, III.1.3.
12
Hume (1988), 98, III.2.48.
Annas (1993), 298.
13
More radical moderns like Nietzsche and, following him, Walter Kauffmann have questioned whether justice makes sense at all. See Kauffmann (1973).
11
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Perhaps he is being torn apart on a rack, but so long as his soul retains its
integrity, life is going about as well as it possibly could.
One ancient view of happiness that rejects this treatment of flourishing as
objective success (rather than as a state of feeling a certain way about one's
success) is the Epicurean account of happiness as a felt experience: the
subjective state of ataraxia or tranquility. To live blessedly, according to the
Epicureans, is to be untroubled by the fear of death or other troubles that
prevent a person from enjoying life. On this Epicurean account of happiness,
practical rationality can conflict with justice. 14 For an Epicurean, reconciling
demands of justice with the rational search for happiness is a task not to be
dispatched by waving a hand at a definition of happiness that may or may not
be what real people want out of life. To reconcile the virtue of justice with
rationality is to show that a disposition to act justly will conduce to
happiness-maybe not in every instance-but overall. The point of establishing a regime of justice is to secure the tranquility that obtains when peaceful
cooperation is the norm. The personal virtue of justice is a disposition to
follow the rules of justice interpreted as a compact the mutual observance of
which is mutually beneficial.
For the Stoics, as Julia Annas puts it, justice 'is simply correct moral
reasoning, thought of as being prescriptive.' 15 But, Annas wonders, if justice
is concerned with public issues, how can we understand reasoning about
justice simply as private moral reasoning? 16 How do we publicly adjudicate
between conflicting views of justice? Hobbes and Locke saw that not everyone
could be a judge; escaping the state of nature requires traditions and institutions of impartial judgment that, among other things, settle who has the
right to make the call.
A contractarian approach is based on an empirical assumption that persons
are separate decision makers as a matter of descriptive fact. Contractarians
treat this descriptive fact as bearing on whether a given institution, as a matter
of fact, has what it takes to help society to be stable as a cooperative venture.
Some contractarians combine this descriptive assumption with a normative
assumption that a society's legitimacy depends on whether it treats separate
persons as not merely instruments, but as partners. Accordingly, such a
society works to constitute itself as a mutually advantageous cooperative
venture. Thus, contractarian reasoning is not simply private moral reasoning
but is reasoning meant to be shared and reasoning about common concerns.
In at least some crucial contexts, reasoning about justice must be public
reasoning.
John Rawls, on the first page of A Theory of Justice, was articulating the
most common modern understanding of justice when he wrote, 'justice is the

first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought.' 17 No matter
what other virtues a social structure may possess, it should be rejected if it is
unjust. On this view, the virtue of justice is a constraint on an acceptable
18
system of social rules.
This conception of justice has roots in the Stoic conception of natural law
and in the Judea-Christian conception of cosmic moral law. The idea was later
developed by a host of modern thinkers, maturing in the work of Immanuel
Kant. Its ancient roots notwithstanding, there is something especially modern
about this conception, for it represents a framework for cooperation for armslength relationships. Consider that modern society, unlike the small city-states
of the Greeks or the commercial republics of the Italians and Dutch, is largely
a society of strangers. For our market society to function smoothly and
peacefully we need a set of stable public rules that creates background conditions for ongoing cooperation between strangers. The rules of justice must be
apt for managing traffic and sustaining cooperation among strangers, including even those who disagree on matters as fundamental as religion.
A fundamental question, on this social conception of justice, is a question
that the virtuous must ask themselves: do you want your
to be
better off with you than without you? Are you capable of living in a way that
would pass that test? Justice on this conception takes on a distinctly cooperative but also distinctly eudaimonistic aspect.
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FROM BENEFICENCE TO 'MERE' JUSTICE
We considered how justice can be seen as an
of character or of
relationships. We acknowledged the attractions of each perspective. There is
also a difference between justice understood as a positive rather than negative
virtue. Like Hume, Adam Smith sees the virtue of justice as securing key
conditions of peace and cooperation.
Mere justice is, upon most occasions, but a negative virtue, and only hinders us
from hurting our neighbour. The man who barely abstains from violating either
the person, or the estate, or the reputation of his neighbours, has surely very little
positive merit. He fulfils, however, all the rules of what is peculiarly called justice,
and does every thing which his equals can with propriety force him to do, or
which they can punish him for not doing. We may often fulfill all the rules of
justice by sitting still and doing nothing. 19

17
14

See Thrasher (2013).

15

Annas (1993), 303.

16

Annas (1993), 303-5.
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19

18
Rawls (1999), 3.
On this point, see Larmore (1996), 19-40.
Smith (2009), 82, II.ii.I.9. Emphasis added.
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Jill can do 'mere' justice simply by minding her business and
others
alone. (But suppose our neighbors are cooperating to produce a public good.
In that case, can we do justice by doing nothing, or does justice in such cases
require us to do our 'fair' share?) Obviously, 'mere' justice is not everything. 20
To act justly is merely to avoid warranting punishment. Smith contrasts justice
(in several ways) with another virtue often confused with justice: beneficence.

Justice as a framework for cooperation makes possible grand achievements
within human society. It makes possible a kind of ambition on behalf of
humanity that Francis Bacon spoke of, finding a ready audience in his onetime
secretary Thomas Hobbes. 23 David Hume and Adam Smith would worry
about what a dangerous thing such noble ambition could be. Adam Smith
described men drawn to the idea that there is one true conception of justice as
'men of system.' The man of system, obsessed with his vision of an ideal world,
forgets that the social world is made up of people who have lives and dreams of
their own, not to mention incompatible theories about how the world ought to
be. The man of system

68

Though the mere want of beneficence seems to merit no punishment from equals,
the greater exertions of that virtue appear to deserve the highest reward. By being
productive of the greatest good, they are the natural and approved objects of the
liveliest gratitude. Though the breach of justice, on the contrary, exposes to
punishment, the observance of the rules of that virtue seems scarce to deserve
any reward. There is, no doubt, a propriety in the practice of justice, and it merits,
upon that account, all the approbation which is due to propriety. But as it does no
real positive good, it is entitled to very little gratitude. 21

Beneficence, unlike justice, is 'free, it cannot be extorted by force, the mere
want of it exposes to no punishment; because the mere want of beneficence
tends to do no real positive evil.' 22 Fiercely though we may resent a person's
indifference, mere lack of beneficence does not imply that the rest of us would
be better off without that person. True injustice is more worrisome. An unjust
person is indeed someone whom the rest of us are, at least in general, better off
without. That makes justice an indispensable foundation of normal relations
between free and equal citizens despite being (on this conception) merely a
negative virtue. A mutual understanding and expectation of justice so conceived will-first of all-define jurisdictions, rules of the road, or spheres of
autonomy. However, there is no reason and no empirical tendency for this
shared understanding to remain merely negative. People want to stand for
something, and they want to achieve something, both individually and collectively. They judge their framework for mutual cooperation by whether it
helps them stay out of each other's way but not only by that. They also care
about whether that framework for cooperation does, after all, lead to cooperation and to a lifting of the ceiling of human possibility.

20

On some accounts, mere justice may not count as a virtue at all, contra Smith. There is a
strong tradition of virtue ethics requiring that 'a virtue expresses a positive aim at some overall
good way of developing, and so a commitment to goodness' (Annas 2011, 102). Or perhaps
Smith would agree with Annas that happening by chance to act as a virtuous person would, is, of
course, not to be virtuous; however, if in doing nothing a person is expressing a certain
steadfastness, characteristically resisting any impulse to jump in and 'do something' simply
because 'something has to be done,' might indeed be expressing a positive aim of being a person
who honors a person's right and responsibility to stand or fall with his or her own merit, at least
in cases where the crisis is not a life-threatening challenge so much as a life-defining learning
experience.
21
22
Smith (2009), 81, II.ii.I.9.
Smith (2009), 78, II.ii.I.3.

is apt to be very wise in his own conceit; and is often so enamoured with the
supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the
smallest deviation from any part of it. He goes on to establish it completely and in
all its parts, without any regard either to the great interests, or to the strong
prejudices which may oppose it. He seems to imagine that he can arrange the
different members of a great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the
different pieces upon a chess-board. He does not consider that the pieces upon
the chess-board have no other principle of motion besides that which the hand
impresses upon them; but that, in the great chess-board of human society, every
single piece has a principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that
which the legislature might chuse to impress upon it. 24

The man of system, intoxicated by an ideal, sees the end of establishing justice
as so important that any means is justified.
even the imperative to
make sure the end genuinely is justice gets lost. Thus, the 'man of system' often
produces results that have nothing to do with justice. Or so we read in the
pages of Smith. The sentiment emerging from Grotius and Locke, through the
Scottish Enlightenment and reaching its apex in John Stuart Mill, is that
disagreement about the true nature of positive justice is something to be
embraced, even cherished, not resented. A society that speaks with one voice
is not
and probably has a warped view of justice to boot. Even at best, it
lacks resources for self-correction, and in that way is like a gene pool that,
lacking in diversity, will not survive changes in its ecological niche.
Smith contrasts the overconfident man of system with the 'man of true
public spirit' who, ' ... when he cannot establish the right, he will not disdain
to ameliorate the wrong; but like Solon, when he cannot establish the best
system of laws, he will endeavour to establish the best that the people can
bear.' 25 Undoing or ameliorating wrongs in piecemeal fashion may not necessarily do more good than imposing a vision of perfection in the teeth of
dissent, but that will be the robust historical tendency.

23

25

24
Bacon (2010).
Smith (2009), 233-4, VI.ii.2.17.
Smith (2009), 233, VI.ii.2.16.
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The function of 'mere' justice-negative
to define a sphere
within which there is such a thing as minding one's own business. Negative
justice defines jurisdictions. It settles who makes the call, not what the call
ought to be, in the same way that a rational traffic management system does
not try to do too much. It does not try to pick a driver's destination; it merely
settles who has the right of way.

we owe certain duties of justice to one another. 29 This conception of justice
requires positive treatment-a particular destination.
David Gauthier argues that Scanlon's positive account of justice conceives
of persons as 'moral debtors.' 30 To Gauthier, understanding justice as 'what we
owe to one another' misunderstands justice from the outset. 31 Gauthier sees
justice as identifying constraints on individual prudence necessary to create
and stabilize the conditions of cooperation. In this way, Gauthier is closer to
Hume and Smith than to Scanlon. Gerald Gaus likewise argues for a 'restricted
view' of the authority of justice. 32 Gaus' s view is also a negative conception
'constituted by the idea that to respect others as free and equal moral persons
is to refrain from claiming moral authority over them,' including the authority
to require that they serve as means to each others' ends. 33 In this sense,
Gauthier and Gaus agree with Smith that while it is proper to enforce rules
of justice, enforcing positive virtues of beneficence and charity would be an
unwarranted exercise of power-incompatible with
fellow citizens as
free and equal.
Gauthier further agrees with Smith that rather than beginning from 'what
we owe to each other,' we might better focus on what we have to offer each
other. 34 Justice is, on this conception, a cooperative virtue. It concerns what we
need to do to properly respect what each of us has to offer-including the
talents, deserved or not, that each of us brings to the table. (Note that dealing
with fellow citizens in the real world-dealing with them respectfully, treating
them as persons-is about taking what they
to the table at face value,
treating their talents as their talents. To instead regard a particular constellation of talents as communal property, the undeserved product of an arbitrary
confluence of genetics and culture, is to regard that constellation of talent as
residing in something other than a person.) 35 In a way, this would not be a
radical departure from the letter of Scanlon' s theory, but it would shift the
emphasis. On this view, contractualist justice would still be about reasons that
others could not reasonably reject, but it would be far more sensitive to the
empirical fact of reasonable people actually rejecting each other's reasons.
Actually respecting the fact of diversity (roughly, letting people be unless their
overt behavior is so disruptive that we would be better off without them)
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FROM MERE JUSTICE TO COOPERATION
The negative conception of justice that we find in Smith contrasts with most
contemporary conceptions. For instance, T. M. Scanlon conceives of justice as
a kind of agreement between free and equal persons.
The contractualist ideal of acting in accord with principles that others (similarly
motivated) could not reasonably reject is meant to characterize the relation with
others the value and appeal of which underlies our reasons to do what morality
requires. This relation, much less personal than friendship, might be called a
relation of mutual recognition. 26

On this view, seeing ourselves in a 'relation of mutual recognition,' motivates
us to act in accord with principles that others could not reasonably reject.
Mutual recognition is a relationship that creates strong duties of treatment.
For those standing in a relationship of mutual recognition, the requirements of
morality are 'not just formal imperatives; they are aspects of a positive value of
a way ofliving together.' 27 The positive value of mutual recognition creates an
element of attraction in the contractualist system. Agents not only refrain
from harming others in ways that justice prohibits; they also see others as
deserving positive treatment because of their status in the mutual recognition
relationship. A just person on this view has an obligation not only to avoid
harming fellow citizens but to make sure they are tolerably well off.
It is no surprise that Scanlon compares mutual recognition to a weak form
of friendship. 28 Being a friend creates duties beyond what we owe to strangers.
This is also true in the relation of mutual recognition. Both friendship and
mutual recognition generate duties that are internal to the relationship. Duties
on this understanding are not impositions; they are basic to our understanding
of ourselves and others as fellow participants in a practice.
Scanlon's view is a well-developed version of the idea that duties of justice
arise from the nature of the relationship between free and equal persons in a
democratic society. By virtue of our recognizing each other as free and equal,

26

Scanlon (1998), 162.

27

Scanlon (1998), 162.

28

See also Cohen (2009).
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Rawls's analogous position explicitly is about justice rather than morality as such.
32
31
Gauthier (2003).
Gauthier (2003), 168.
Gaus (2011), 15-20.
Gaus (2011), 19. One tension in the Smithian tradition concerns whether this homage to
the separateness of persons goes so far as to include ends that must be achieved if people are to be
capable of normal functioning as free and equal citizens. Smith himself endorsed mandatory
publicly funded schooling and other elements of what today we might think of as a minimal
welfare state. Smith would not deny that such ends are of surpassing value; his question would be
whether those ends are well-served by reconceiving them as rights rather than values. Ultimately,
this was a question of policy, not of justice.
34
35
Gauthier (2003), 168.
See Part 6 of Schmidtz (2006).
30
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enables us to live together, and live more
than we
otherwise could by living apart. 36
As Smith puts it, society, 'cannot subsist among those who are at all times
ready to hurt and injure one another.' 37 We cannot cooperate and have our
needs met if we are huddled in bunkers or pointing guns at each other. Regular
and effective law secures gains, though, freeing individuals to focus on improving their situation through reciprocal cooperation, without having to
worry about their gains being stolen.
Justice as a cooperative positive virtue has roots in justice as a personrespecting negative virtue. Insofar as it limits negative externalities of public
life, 'mere' justice reduces the cost of living together, making it safer for people
to trust each other and thereby setting the stage for a cornucopia of positive
externalities that go with cooperation. Justice as a cooperative virtue is about
creating circumstances that inspire us to make our partners better off with us
than they would have been without us. Schmidtz writes, 'When people reciprocate, they teach people around them to cooperate. In the process, they not
only respect justice, but foster it. Specifically, they foster a form of justice that
enables people to live together in mutually respectful peace.'38

CONCLUSION
We noted that justice can be and historically has been seen as a feature of a
person's character, that it also can be seen as a virtue of institutions, but that
there is a further virtue of character that has to do with respecting the virtues
of institutions. We endorsed all three ideas, but particularly the third one as a
way of modernizing the ancient conception of justice as a harmony among
parts of the soul. Along the way, we considered how 'mere' justice can be seen
as a primarily negative virtue in part because it grounds something more
positive, namely community. Suppose people are regarded as having a right to
say no. Suppose this right is seen as the essence of Kantian dignity, even if not
a sufficient condition for full-blown Kantian moral worth. Respecting this
right to say no, thereby meeting the minimal conditions of justice, is the
foundation of a community in which people can be trusted not to presume
to own each other. In such a community, people with fundamentally different
36
Rawls goes beyond this, of course, defining a Pareto frontier and then saying that, for the sake
of having a determinate view, we must pick a distribution on that frontier that privileges one class
or another. If we are going to pick a class upon which to confer the maximum possible unearned
privilege, then the only point that bears even a remote resemblance to justice is the point where the
class so privileged is the class that otherwise was least privileged. But the resemblance between this
and what we normally think of as justice truly is remote.
37
38
Smith (2009), 86, II.ii.3.3.
Schmidtz (2006), 79.
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views
be able to afford the risk and cost of living in
dealing with each other on terms that will constitute them as a KmLgaom
ends.
We considered what it would be like to achieve
like ........ ,,....,,.r,.-.u
among the
of a diverse society in which disagreement can run deepwhere the disagreement is not about how or why to avoid physical violence so
much as about how people should conceive of themselves, of their relationships, and of what they are owed.
Our map of justice is pluralistic, reflecting how thinking has changed
without assuming that previous thought must have been wrong. Would a
more elegant theory reduce the multiplicity of elements to one? Would
a monist theory be more useful? Would it even be
Not necessarily. The periodic table would in a
way be simpler if
we posited
four elements-or one, for that matter-but would that make
for better science? No. Astronomers once said
orbits. When they finally accepted the
of . ,_. . _ q,_,.,. . .., .......
two focal
their theories became simpler, more elegant,
more
powerful. Simplicity is a theoretical virtue, but when a phenomenon looks
complex-when an orbit seems to have two
not one-the
explanation may be that it looks
because it is. We may find a way
of doing everything with a single
but it would be mere dogma-the
opposite of philosophy-to assume we must. 39
u ....u ...._, ......, ...
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Fortitude and

Conflict
Daniel Mclnerny

INTRODUCTION
From the work of Alasdair Macintyre we have learned that moral theories are
never free-floating constructs in some theoretical aether,
are always the
expressions of particular cultural milieus. 1 And so it is with theories about
virtue. When inquiring into a virtue such as fortitude or courage, it is crucial to
keep in mind the social and cultural environment(s) which serve as the context
for the inquiry. The fortitude of fifth-century Sparta is a fundamentally
different virtue than the fortitude that Socrates does not
in Plato's
Laches. Likewise, the fortitude of a Quaker pacifist is not at all the same as that
of an American solider fighting in Afghanistan, much less that of an Islamic
terrorist seeking martyrdom.
One response to such a plurality of accounts is to seek a generic conception
of courage, one that is neutral to all cultures. Something, presumably, such as:
'Courage is that characteristic which allows us to face up to our fears and
overcome obstacles for the sake of some deeply-cherished value.' But this is
not so much a definition of courage as a ghost of the virtue. What sort of
characteristic are we talking about? What fears and obstacles? What cherished
value? When answers are provided for these questions, we find ourselves right
back in the thick of particular cultural frameworks.
So in inquiring into the nature of courage, there is nothing to do but to take
up the challenge of competing frameworks. No inquiry can possibly take up
them all, but in what follows I will consider
of the more prominent
frameworks and their accounts of courage, with the ultimate aim of discovering what conceptual connections might hold between them, and how we
might discern within these connections the truth about this virtue.

1

See, for example, Macintyre (1998).

